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Abstract 
 The paper presents a two period model with two types of money i.e. dirty and cleans (legal) 
money in utility function. Clean money is earned from working in legal sector and dirty from 
illegal sector. Our two-two period model reveals that an increase in labor wage in legal sector 
unambiguously decease the labor hours allocated for illegal sector by increasing the opportunity 
cost for illegal activities. However, the crime-reducing impact of anti-money laundry regulation 
and the probability of the agent to be caught require both parameters should be above some 
threshold. This finding is extension to the existing literature. This threshold is a function of the 
marginal rate of substitution of „dirty‟ money for consumption and the responsiveness of illegal 
income to the policy parameter. Higher threshold implies the need for tougher anti-money 
laundry regime. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between „dirty‟ money and 
consumption, and the elasticity of illegal income to the policy parameter are the key in the 
formulation of anti money laundering policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Anti-money laundering policy has become a major issue in most part of the world, particularly in 
developed countries and has become an important front in the fight against crime. According to 
Wasserman (2002), measures against money laundering can facilitate detection of financial trails 
that provide important source of evidence, potentially linking the members of a criminal 
organization. In this sense, anti-money laundry regime can be understood in terms of increased 
efficiency of the legal system or catching offenders who otherwise would escape. Moreover, 
finding and seizing money or assets that result from criminal activity can discourage crime. 
Moreira (2007) pointed out two ways of combating criminality: repressing organized crime by 
legal authorities and by acting preventively and repressively against money laundering process.  
 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Chong (2007) describe money laundering as any process that tries to 
legitimize the proceeds of illegal activities maintaining the value of the acquired asset. In other 
words, it is carried out to disguise or conceal the nature or source of entitlement to money or 
property from criminal activities .This process, in fact, is critical to the effective execution of 
organized crime. Anti-money laundry regime can be understood in terms of increased efficiency 
of the legal system or catching offenders who otherwise would escape. 
 
Although the relevance of the study of anti-money laundering policy and organized crime seem 
growing, there is relatively very limited theoretical and empirical work on the issue. Camera 
(2001) has noted that, until now little has been done to construct a model capable of rationalizing 
such a policy. There is a need for appropriate policy measures to establish both local and 
international institutes to effectively combat organize crime and money laundering.  
3 
 
 
There are some theoretical and empirical studies that have attempted to model and empirically 
test the link between anti-money laundry regulation and organized crime. Moreira's (2007) result 
of the two-period model unveil that effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies negatively 
affects the amount of resources obtained from criminal activities. Araujo and Moreira (2005) 
present a basic growth model. Their results are: (i) the effectiveness of anti-money laundering 
regulations positively affects consumption, (ii) there exist equilibrium solutions where legal and 
illegal activities coexist, and (iii) when the steady state results of two economies in a Sidrauski 
framework, the proportion between consumption and the capital stock is the same, but the level 
of consumption and capital stock is greater in a legal economy. 
 
Ferwerda (2008) studied whether anti-money laundry policy reduces crime rate. He employed 
the basic model of „economics of crime‟, which explains criminal behavior on the assumption of 
rational choice, based on the expected utility framework and extends the model by including 
money laundry and models `the economics of crime and money laundry'. His theoretical model 
shows that anti-money laundering policy deters potential criminals to commit not only the illegal 
act of laundering money, but crime in general. His empirical evidence shows that the crime level 
in a country can be reduced by improving anti-money laundering policies, especially if it focuses 
on international cooperation. However, Lopez-de-Silanes and Chong (2007) found out that 
measures that criminalize feeding activities and improve confiscation tend to matter more than 
other features of legislation. 
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Vaithilingam & Nair (2007) examines the factors that underpin the pervasiveness of money 
laundering, using a sample of 88 developed and developing countries, and found out that 
efficient legal framework with good corporate governance lower the pervasiveness of money 
laundering activities and a high-innovative capacity contribute negatively to the pervasiveness of 
money laundering activities. Masciandro (1999) also highlighted the inverse relationship 
between the degree of diffusion of money laundering activities and the effectiveness of anti-
money laundering regulation in a given economy.  
 
Following the previous studies (e.g., Araujo and Moreira, 2005; & Moreira, 2007), this paper 
presents a two period model in the classical framework of money- in- the- utility function to 
study the impact of anti-money laundry regulation to combat crime. As in the previous studies, it 
assumes a representative agent involving in both legal and illegal activities concomitantly to 
acquire goods and services. He uses the criminal sector to carry out criminal offenses and uses 
money laundry to hide the revenues of these activities in the formal economy. However, we 
assume that the income generated in the illegal sector has no purchasing power
1
 before it is 
laundered and is used in the second period. Ferwerda (2008), for instance, noted that money 
laundering (at least to some extent) is needed in order to spend the money derived from illegal 
activities. Therefore, the agent involves in criminal activities only in the first period and the 
punishment
2
 will occur in the second period. In contrast to Araujo and Moreira (2005) work
3
, we 
do not make any specific assumption on the nature of the criminal activities. Such activities must 
meet the only requirement of producing „dirty‟ money.  
                                                 
1
 Notice similar assumption by Araujo and Moreira, 2005. 
2
 Punishment is a part of enforcement pillar of the anti-money laundry regime. It mostly involves confiscation of the 
criminal proceeds.  
3
 They assume a representative agent embezzles part of government transfer. 
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2. The Model 
 
We consider an agent that maximizes lifetime utility U which depends on period consumptions 
level and on money holdings. The basic framework follows the classic work by Sidrauski (1967) 
on money- in- the- utility function. We assume that agents derive utility from money (both 
„clean‟ and „dirty‟ money) only in the first period. 
                                                                                                                          (1) 
Where     and    are consumption levels in two periods, and  and   are money of legal origin 
and „dirty‟4 money. Moreover, 0< <1 represents the subjective discount or time preference 
factor. The period utility function is strictly increasing and concave in consumption and money, 
            and                  . The agent allocates his one unit of time between legal 
and illegal activities. A fraction α5 of his time is spent in the legal sector. The remaining fraction 
of his time (1- α) is spent in the illegal sector where he commits criminal offense to generate 
illegal income and involves in money-laundry activities
6
.  
Let z represent the illegal sector of the form: 
                                                                                                                     (2) 
Where 0 <  <1, 0 <   <1 and 0 <   <1. Here   represents elasticity between illegal income and 
the time allocated for illegal activity and        represents elasticity between illegal income 
and proxies to the ineffectiveness of the anti-money laundry regulation      and the subjective 
                                                 
4
 Dirty money refers to money obtained illegally. 
5
 Assume crime and work are substitute activities. 
6
 In many cases, it is not unusual to assume that the offender himself involves in money laundering (see Gilmore, 
1999). 
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probability
7
 that agent is not caught     . In fact, both proxies as a product can be understood 
as efficiency parameter in the illegal sector.  
We have the legal economy of the form: 
       per capita form:                                                                                                    (3) 
Where L is labor and     
 Hence, in the first period we have 
                                                                                                                           (4) 
Where  and   are money of legal origin and „dirty‟ money respectively. A representative agent 
can hold its wealth in the form of    and   .  And    is the income from legal sector, where w 
represent wage rate in the legal sector. With our assumption of no purchasing power of illegal 
income in the first period, we have 
                                                                                                                                              (5) 
Equation (5) states that a representative agent saves all its illegal income in the form of dirty 
money. In the second period, the individual can consume an amount equal to saving from legal 
(m) and illegal income minus the value of illegal income that can be apprehended by legal 
authorities in the second period (cost due to anti-money laundering regulation
8
). Therefore, we 
have  
                                                                                   (6) 
                                                 
7
 The effort of the police force and legal system to caught and punish criminals is measured by the probability    
8
 The cost of money laundering will therefore depend on the effectiveness of anti-money laundry regulation. 
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A representative agent solves the following Lagrangian maximization problem: 
Max:                                                   
 (1+ )                                                                                                                                (7) 
FOC: 
        
                                                                                                                                    (8) 
        
         
     
  
   
 
   
  
 
 
                                                                                     (9) 
the latter being a standard intertemporal Euler equation. Further, first order condition with 
respect to  yields 
   
       
 
   
                                                                                                                   (10) 
This implies 
  
 
   
      
 
   
  ,                                                                                                                     (11) 
Equation (11) represents the marginal rate of substitution between money (clean) and 
consumption.    
  and    
 denotes the marginal benefit of holding additional money and the 
marginal benefit of an additional consumption in the first period respectively. 
Moreover, FOC with respect to   gives: 
    
     
       
     
                                                                                                                    (12) 
this implies 
   
 
   
   
       
     
 ,                                                                                       (13) 
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Equation (13) represents the marginal rate of substitution
9
           of dirty money for 
consumption. 
Finally, FOC with respect to   yields: 
       
                                  
     
     
                          
     
                  (14) 
From (12) we obtain the optimal fraction of time allocated to the legal activity 
                
          
      
 
 
   
                                                                                (15) 
Let   
          
      
 
        
 
, and rewrite equation (15) as: 
                  
 
                                                                                                (16) 
The partial derivatives of    with respect to   and w: 
   
  
 
            
   
 
 
    
          
       
                                                                                      (17) 
and  
   
  
        
 
    
      
           
 
 
                                                                               (18) 
The condition
10
 gives                                                                              (19) 
The right-hand side of equation (19) represents the critical or threshold value   .The comparative 
statics (18) implies that an increase in effectiveness of anti-money laundry policy will increase 
the time allocated for the legal activity, only if the effectiveness of anti-money laundry 
regulation satisfies equation (19). Equation (19) indicates that   must be above this threshold to 
have a positive impact (i.e.,   >  ). 
Further, FOC with respect to   gives: 
                                                 
9
 Assuming a positive       implies 
       
     
   
10
 Assume     gives the reduced form,                     
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                                                                                (20) 
The condition gives                                                                                  (21) 
The right-hand side of equation (21) represents the critical or threshold value    
Taking equation (2) and (5) and substituting     implies: 
                                            
 
                                             (22) 
where 
    
  
  
            
     
           
      
 
    
                                                                                       (23) 
    
  
       
       
           
 
    
     
 
                                                                                (24) 
The condition gives      
                 
 
                                                                         (25) 
Let the right-hand side of equation (25) represented by   
  showing the critical value. 
    
  
       
       
           
 
    
     
 
                                                                                (26) 
The condition gives      
                 
 
                                                                        (27) 
  
  represents the threshold value which is the right-hand side of equation (27). The comparative 
statics from (23) indicates that an increase in wage reduces the optimal stock of dirty money by 
increasing the opportunity cost of illegal activities. However, anti-money laundry regulation 
discourages illegal activities, only if the anti-money laundry regulation satisfies equation (25). 
As usual, equation (25) indicates that   must be above this threshold to reduce the amount of 
dirty money
11
.  
                                                 
11
 The same line of argument applies to the subjective probability term p 
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2.1 A General of the Model 
 
Our model in the previous section makes a distinction between efforts of the legal system to 
prosecute and punish criminals (p) and anti-money laundering policy (   to prevent criminals 
from laundering their ill-gotten proceeds. However, as pointed out by Reuter and Truman (2004), 
AML as it has evolved over some thirty years has two basic pillars: prevention and 
enforcement
12
.  The prevention pillar of the AML regime is designed to deter criminals from 
using private individuals and institution to launder the proceeds of their crime. Enforcement is 
designed to punish criminals when, despite prevention effort, they have facilitated the successful 
laundering of those proceeds. As criminals gather the proceeds of their predicate crimes, the 
investigation, prosecution and punishment, and confiscation elements of the enforcement pillar 
are employed to combat the underlying crime as well as to tighten the screws on the money 
laundering process (see Truman & Reuter, 2004). Lopez-de-Silanes and Chong (2007)
13
 
empirically studied which aspect of the anti-money laundry regulation matters the most and 
found out the enforcement pillar
14
 is found out to be the most important one. 
Therefore, we assume that p and   are strongly correlated and can be understood as the two pillar 
of the anti-money laundry policy.  As in the case of Moreira (2007), without the loss of 
generality, we admit that 
p=                                                                                                                                              (28) 
Given equation (28), we rearrange and resolve the previous maximization model and the results 
are presented below.  
                                                 
12
 Lopez-de-Silanes and Chong (2007) noted that the two are not mutually exclusive. 
13
 They admit the limitation of their data to capture different aspects of prevention and enforcement  
14
 Particularly criminalizing the feeding activities and improved confiscation  
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Our illegal sector will take the following form: 
                                                                                                                          (29)              
Consumption in the first period (Equation 4) remains the same and consumption in the second 
period is given by: 
        
                                                                                 (30) 
We can rewrite the agent‟s optimization problem (equation 7) as  
  Max:                          
                     
 (1+ )                                                                                                                                (31) 
The first-order condition with respect to    ,    and  and remain the same as given by equation 
(8), (9) and (10). 
FOC with respect to  and   yield: 
    
     
    
     
                                                                                                                          (29) 
this implies 
   
 
   
   
    
     
                                                                                                                               (30)      
The left hand side of equation (30) represents the marginal rate of substitution
15
           of 
dirty money for consumption, while the right hand side can be understood as the price of present 
dirty money in terms of current consumption. It is easy to note that the higher the effectiveness 
of the AML policy, the higher the price of dirty money with respect to the current consumption. 
First-order condition with respect to   yields the following optimal (equilibrium) value of labor 
allocation in the legal sector. 
                                                 
15
 Assuming a positive       implies 
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Let B = 
       
      
 = 
        
 
 , and rewrite equation (31) as 
              
 
                                                                                                           (32) 
The partial derivatives of    with respect to   and w: 
   
  
 
      
   
 
       
       
  
 
                                                                                                   (33) 
and  
   
  
         
 
    
      
           
 
 
                                                                            (34) 
The condition gives                                                                                (35) 
It is not surprising that equation (35) is the same as equation (17) showing equal threshold 
value
16
. 
Taking equation (2), (5) and (31) implies: 
                                  
 
                                                                  (36) 
where 
    
  
  
      
     
        
      
 
    
                                                                                              (37) 
    
  
        
       
           
 
    
     
 
                                                                         (38) 
The condition gives      
                 
 
                                                                    (39) 
A close look to the equation (39) indicates that it is exactly a similar condition as equation (25). 
 
In general, we can argue that our model in Section2.1 captures the two aspects of the AMR and 
allow us to specifically study the impact of AMR to combat crime. Moreover, it allows us to 
                                                 
16
 This result, in fact, validate our assumption given by equation (28) 
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reach the same conclusion without having considerable differences in our solution to the 
optimization problem. 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents a two-period model based on the classic framework of money- in- the- utility 
function, whereby, an individual is assumed to engage concomitantly in both legal and illegal 
activities. Our model reveals that an increase in labor wage in legal sector unambiguously 
decrease the labor hours allocated for illegal sector by increasing the opportunity cost for illegal 
activities. However, the crime-reducing impact of anti-money laundry regulation and probability 
of the agent to be caught and punished require that both parameters should be above some 
critical or threshold value. This threshold is a function of the marginal rate of substitution
17
 
(          of „dirty‟ money for consumption and the elasticity parameter in the illegal sector. 
Higher marginal rate of substitution implies that a representative agent places higher value on 
holding one extra unit of „dirty‟ money (higher opportunity cost). Higher effectiveness of anti-
money laundry policy and probability (subjective) of being caught drive the value of dirty money 
(in terms of current consumption) up. In effect, it may discourage criminality. Moreover, higher 
value of the elasticity term implies more inelastic or less responsive of the illegal income to the 
policy parameters.  
Therefore, lower           and less responsive illegal income to anti-money laundry policy and 
the probability to be caught imply that the anti-money laundering regulation reduce the incentive 
for illegal activity if the policy parameter ( ) is above some critical or threshold value   
  (higher 
                                                 
17
 Higher marginal rate of substitution            of dirty money for consumption implies that the individual is 
willing to give up more of consumption to have an additional unit of dirty money. 
14 
 
threshold). Moreover, higher marginal rate of substitution and more responsive illegal income to 
the anti-money laundry regulation and the probability of being caught, imply that effectiveness 
of anti-money laundering policy discourage illegal activities if the policy parameter ( ) is above 
some critical or threshold value   
  (lower threshold). Therefore, we see that   
  >   
 , which 
implies the need for stringent anti-money laundry regulation. In sum, the marginal rate of 
substitution between ‟dirty‟ money and consumption and the responsiveness of illegal income to 
the policy parameter are the key in governing the formulation of the anti-money laundry policy. 
Finally, the assumption of strong correlation between anti-money laundry policy effectiveness 
and the probability of being caught for the predicate crime doesn‟t considerably change our 
result and conclusion. However, it captures, in a better sense, the two aspect of AMR: prevention 
and enforcement. 
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